Restitution by Russia of Works of Art Removed from German Territory original owner State to bring actions in rem based upon its rules of public law. 8 The latter cases are to be settled exclusively by public international law rules, including such topics as the allowing of the retention of property with the aim of providing war reparation, payment of damages or restitution in kind, adverse possession in the absence of proper title, or inversely, configuration of the fact as an international wrong, and finally extinctive prescription in the case of claims not made within a reasonable period of time.
n. The State of International Law in 1945
A juridical fact must be appreciated in the light of the law contemporary with it, and not of the law in force at the time when a dispute in regard to it arises or falls to be settled. 9 This principle of inter-temporal law leads us to examine the state of international law at the end of the Second World War, in order to verify the existence of a rule which authorized or otherwise the removal of works of art from the vanquished country as a form of reparation.
Article 56 of the Laws and Customs of Land Warfare, encompassed in the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907, stated that all property, including State property, dedicated to, among other things, 'education, the arts and sciences', was to be treated as private property, and hence neither confiscable (Article 46) nor subject to plunder (Article 47) by the occupying forces.
10 Therefore, this provision had the effect of excluding the legitimacy of so called 'war booty', even if scholarship on the issue is not unanimous in regarding the provision as codifying customary international law." 
Andrea Gattini
Even leaving aside this much-debated question, in the period immediately following the Second World War, of the applicability of the Hague Regulations in the case of unconditional surrender and the consequent collapse of government, 12 it is certain that the provisions of the Hague Regulations did not resolve, nor could they have resolved, the problem of whether the cultural property of the vanquished country, could form part of claims for reparations, either within or outside the context of peace treaties. 13 The treaties which put an end to the First World War threw no light on this question. The Treaty of Versailles contained few articles which imposed obligations on Germany to restitute, hand over, or replace specifically indicated cultural property.
Of the three relevant Articles, 14 only one seems to be connected with the issue of reparations. Article 247 established, in the first paragraph, that Germany should 'Kunstraub im Krieg', supra note 3, at 55. The best interpretation is that which traces the awareness of the unlawfulness of taking works of art as war booty back to the end of the Napoleonic Wars. Well known is Canova's contribution as Pope Pious VII's emissary for the recovery of the Vatican's works of art in Paris in 1815, and his sentence: 'Everything which regards the culture of art and science is above all rights of war and victory', see Jayme, 'Antonio Canova, la repubblica delle arti e il diritto intemazionale', RD/ (1992) The first clause gives an example of replacement in kind; the second an example of a specific obligation of reparation. The altar pieces in question had in fact been legitimately purchased in the first half of the 19th century and kept for some time in the museums of Berlin and Munich. 15 It is evident that Article 247 was intended to provide relief for the serious losses suffered by Belgium as a result of German aggression. The phrase 'in order to enable Belgium to reconstitute two great artistic works', inserted almost under the guise of justification in Article 247(2), conveys a further aspect, which was completely innovative in that period and is of particular interest today, that is, the return of works of art to the country of origin with the objective of reintegrating its national historical and artistic heritage.
Also in the Peace Treaties concluded following the Second World War, the question of the admission of the handing over of cultural property as a form of reparation did not receive a unanimous response.
In the Peace Treaties with Italy (Article 75(9)), Hungary (Article 24(3)) and Bulgaria (Article 22(3)), an identical rule exists which provides for the obligation of restitution in kind 16 to the countries of origin of objects of artistic, historical or archaeological value, illegally removed during the war, on the condition that objects which are comparable in value or characteristic are present in the country obliged to
The first was the presumedly original copy of the Koran belonging to Caliph Osman, removed from Medina by the Turkish authorities and given to ex-Emperor Wilhelm II, to be returned to the King of Hedioz. The German delegation objected, however, that the Koran in question had never been given to the Emperor. The other object to be returned to the British Government was the skull of Sultan Mkwawa, chief of the Wahibi tribe, who were hostile to the German colonisers. The Germans were accused of having removed the relic. Also in this case the German delegation objected that the skull had been substituted with another by Mkwawa's followers, when it was still in Africa (see Engstler, supra note 11, at 127). restitute. 17 There is no analogous regulation, however, in the Peace Treaties with Romania and Finland, which limit themselves to imposing a general obligation of restitution of goods which had been illegally removed (Articles 23 and 24 respectively).
It is not easy to place the regulations concerning the restitution in kind of cultural properties within the process of reparations. It is clear that, if the general aim of reparations is to eliminate the consequences of a wrong, in the case of looting of cultural property, reparation should involve its restitution. 18 In the case of the impossibility of restitution, either because the property no longer exists or is missing, there is a dilemma. Is it reasonable to ask for another object which, even if it is equal in value to the lost one, will never replace it in its uniqueness? It is certainly arguable that restitution in kind is not suitable for such objects. On the other hand, is it reasonable to provide for financial compensation for the loss of an object of often priceless value, whose cultural value does not correspond to the mere commercial one? Restitution in kind, with its vague scent of vengeance, may be considered as the only kind of reparation which more fully satisfies the needs of the victim State.
Once having accepted restitution in kind as being applicable also to cultural property, as is the case in many post-war Peace Treaties, there remain some difficulties of interpretation. The 'comparability' criterion is not very clear: is it only An argument has been made which attributes an exceptional status to restitution in kind, by making a conceptual distinction between Article 247 of the Treaty of Versailles, which only concerned property destroyed during the hostilities, and the articles concerning restitution in kind in the second post-war peace treaties, which more generally concerned removed property whose restitution was found to be impossible.
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This distinction is artful. It is, in fact, restitution in kind in both cases: the only difference is the extension of the rule. 21 This also means that it is impossible to extrapolate a general concept of restitution in kind from the relevant regulations of the 1947 Peace Treaties. In conclusion, the fact that restitution in kind for cultural property has been provided for in some, but not all, of the post-war Peace Treaties, 22 the indetermination of its extent, plus the different attitudes adopted by the Allies in the years 1945-1946 regarding the soundness of using German cultural property for restitution in kind 23 are further elements that demonstrate how the concept did not reach at the time a clear customary law status.
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Thirty years ago Engstler, supra note 11, at 163, sustained the second theory, on the basis of some elements which are inferable from the text of the relevant Peace Treaty articles. The aim of the rules is to integrate 'the cultural heritage of the United Nation from whose territory such objects were removed', which is possible only where the substituted property has a cultural significance which is equal to that of the original, either because they come from the same cultural area or because they are otherwise linked to the requesting country. 
III. The Removal of German Cultural Property by the Soviet Union
During the Nazi aggression against the Soviet Union, many works of art and millions of books were plundered, burnt and destroyed, with the more or less explicit aim of extinguishing the cultural identity of the population of the Soviet Union, considered by Hitler to be Untermenschen. The plunder of works of art was performed mainly by units of the SS, using methods so brutal that they draw criticism from Reichsleiter Rosenberg himself. Rosenberg was head of the Einsatzstab, the office responsible for the transportation of cultural property from the occupied countries to Germany, in order to 'put them in a safe place'.
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It is an open secret that during the last weeks of fighting special commissions of the Red Army's experts, whose official mission was to look for the cultural property stolen by the Nazis, extended their activity also to the removal and transport to the Soviet Union of German cultural property. Large doubts have always remained over the quantity of such property. For almost fifty years, it was not even known if it had been destroyed, or if it was kept in secret depots in the Soviet Union, although Soviet Governments repeatedly denied such rumours. It was during the last years of the Gorbachev Government, and even more so after the disintegration of the Soviet 
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Union, that the art treasures removed from Germany were 'found' in the stores of Russian museums.
25
As for the German cultural property whose presence in the Soviet Union had been known about since 1945, the official theory sustained by the various Soviet Governments, especially after the creation of the DDR, was that removal had been necessary to save the works of art from the destruction of the war. This version of the facts does not fully correspond to the truth, since, at the time of their evacuation Germany had already surrendered. Neither is it easily compatible with the name 'Trophy Commissions', which was given to the specialized sections within the Red Army entrusted with the task of organizing the evacuation of art treasures. 26 This is the case, for instance, of hundreds of masterpieces from the Dresden Gemaldegalerie, and of the treasure of the Saxon Crown of the renowned Griine Gewolbe in Dresden, found by the Soviets in the sandstone cave of GroB Cotta near Pirna and in the calcareous cave of Pockau-Lengefeld, 80 kilometres south of MeiBen, then taken to the Pillnitz castle near Dresden between 9 and 28 July 1945, and from there transported to the Soviet Union at the end of July 1945. After some years, during which nothing was known of their fate, the paintings were given back, restored, in 1955, as a 'friendly gesture of the Soviet people to the people of Democratic Germany'. 27 The jewels of the Griinen Gewblbes found their way back in November 1958, only after the declaration of the USSR Council of Ministers, of 7 January 1957 on the 'restitution of cultural property on reciprocal basis'.
28
The German Government has now been trying to get the cultural property removed from Germany at the end of the conflict back from Russia for almost five years. 29 Germany is asking for the restitution of almost 200,000 works of art, 2 
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In the new spirit of collaboration and friendship between Germany and the Soviet Union, due to the policies of President Gorbachev, it was finally possible to also face the delicate issue of German cultural property transported to the Soviet Union at the end of the conflict. In the Treaty of Good Neighbourhood and Cooperation between Germany and the Soviet Union of 9 November 1990, Article 16(2) states that the parties 'agree that lost or unlawfully transferred art treasures which are located in their territory will be returned to their owners or their successors '. 32 After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the German and Russian Governments concluded a new agreement of cultural cooperation, on 16 December 1992, in which Article 15 confirmed the commitment to the restitution of cultural property which was 'lost' or 'unlawfully brought into the territory'.
33
Following the cooperation treaty of 1990 the two Governments each established a national restitution commission. During the first joint session of the bilateral Commission, which took place in Moscow on 23-24 March 1994, the German delegation became aware of the new unexpected interpretation given to Article 16 of the cooperation treaty by the Russian delegation. The property removed soon after the end of the Second World War by the Trophy Commissions would not in fact be considered 'lost', since the Soviet authorities knew of its location in the stores of State museums. Nor would it be considered 'unlawfully transferred', since its removal to the Soviet Union was done for security reasons, while waiting for a definition of its status. The formula adopted by Article 16 would thus refer only to the property which was effectively lost or stolen, not necessarily as a consequence of the events of war.
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Only by overcoming some resistance from the Russian side did the German delegation manage to include in the session's protocol a passage which specifies the objective of the Commission's activity as the restitution of cultural property illegally withdrawn during or after the Second World War. Since then the negotiations seem to have come to a standstill.
At a still unofficial level, many arguments have been advanced in Russia which are in opposition to the unconditional restitution of cultural property to Germany. Before proceeding with this study, it is important to clarify one aspect. Among the works of art kept in Russia there are many that belonged to private collections. The most important is the Krebs collection, which before the war was the biggest It appears that, the current debate in Russia is not concerned with the public or private character of the property. The distinction is, however, fundamental. According to the procedure followed at the end of the Second World War, the use of private property as reparations was limited to the liquidation of the enemy's property located abroad -if one excludes the policy of demolition of German industrial structures during the first years of occupation, especially in the Soviet zone, which was at least officially aimed at the demilitarization of the country.
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The retention of private cultural property as reparation for war damages is thus excluded, even as a sub specie of restitution in kind.
Among the arguments advanced in Russia to refuse the restitution of private property, are references to the declaration by the Federal Republic itself, confirmed in the signing of the Moscow Treaty on 12 September 1990, that it would consider irreversible the expropriation measures performed between 1945 and 1949 in the zone of Soviet occupation. 36 This argument has no foundation. Actually, the joint declaration of the Federal Republic and the DDR Governments of 15 June 1990, referred to the issue of real estate expropriations, and moreover, during the Two + Four negotiations, the Soviet Government had justified the expropriation measures Before entering into the discussion of the Russian arguments against the restitution in toto of the cultural property removed from Germany, it is perhaps opportune to first raise a further issue as yet unbroached by the parties, and ask whether the possible German right to restitution has not been extinguished.
As is well known, the subject of prescription in international law is quite controversial. 38 The doctrine supplies generic indications, which, when applied to our case, neutralize each other: on one hand, limitation of actions between States is less rigorous then that for claims of private citizens against a State, but, on the other hand, the limitation of actions in tort is more strict than that for breach of contract.
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Furthermore it is also necessary to keep in mind that the specialist literature tends to consider prescription in the subject of restitution of cultural property inapplicable in the relations between States.
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Besides extinctive prescription, the different and broader concept of acquiescence must also be considered, which, under certain conditions, can imply the loss of rights.
While for property belonging to museums and libraries situated in West Germany it is not reasonable to speak of acquiescence by the Federal Government, which was completely unaware of its fate, it is not certain that the same could be said of property belonging to collections or libraries originally situated in eastern Germany. 
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Since our case deals with acquiescence, it is necessary to clarify an important aspect of such a phenomenon, which is not always made precise in scholarly work, that is, its distinction from tacit consent. Certain discourse, while recognizing that acquiescence is translated into a plurality of legal situations, places acquiescence in the scheme of tacit or implicit consensus. The consequence is that acquiescence is admitted only regarding those claims the existence of which is actually brought to the knowledge of the State against which the claim is to be made. The presumption of consent can be overturned by the demonstration of a contrary will. 43 Another strand of argumentation, however, correctly highlights the distinction between the concepts of acquiescence and tacit agreement. Since it is a factual circumstance, acquiescence is definitive. The demonstration of the reasons for which a State did not object or remained passive in a certain situation, as for instance its concern not to disturb its good relations with another State, is irrelevant. 
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V. The Application of Restitution in Kind
Returning to the arguments circulating in Russia and keeping in mind that they are not clearly distinguishable from each other, it can be said that the starting point is the legitimacy of the removal to the Soviet Union of German cultural property after the Second World War. This basic persuasion can take on more or less sophisticated shapes. Nationalistic conservative groups became very vocal in maintaining the right of the Russian people to German cultural property as indemnity for the 30 million dead and for all the suffering and atrocities Russia had to endure through Nazi aggression. A more subtle and flexible approach, which leaves the Russian Government more room to negotiate, is promoted by the Russian delegation in the multi-party Commission on restitution, and by some academics. It views the German cultural property as 'pledge' against the restitution of Russian cultural property dispersed during the war. It holds Article 16 of the cooperation Treaty of 1990 not to be an impediment in itself to the application of the principle of restitution in kind, in the case that the restitution of cultural property withdrawn by the Nazis from Soviet territory should prove to be impossible. As an alternative to the retention of the German cultural property, the advocates of the 'pledge' theory suggest that the Russian Government should ask for substantial monetary compensation from Germany in exchange for restitution. Still another argument hides the unwillingness to settle the controversy under the standards of international law, by arguing that the solution must come from the Russian Parliament, duly expressed in a statute, pending which every decision is premature.
To anticipate my conclusions, I am of the opinion that the Russian position can not be accepted. To begin with the last argument, the enactment of a domestic statute, holding that all cultural property belongs to the Russian people and is inalienable, would of course create a formidable hurdle or even render restitution impossible, but it could not solve the question of the interpretation of Article 16 of the Russian-German cooperation treaty. The international controversy would still exist. Even if the view were to prevail that a subsequent domestic statute supersedes a previous international agreement, still the question would remain of whether the retention of cultural property of the defeated country as a form of war reparation is permissible under international law.
But this is precisely the core of the matter and the Russian argument that such retention is perfectly legitimate can not be casually dismissed. Its refutation calls for a thorough analysis.
Even if soon after the Second World War there was no concordance of views among the Allied States regarding the use of German cultural property as reparations, all were in favour of some application of the principle of restitution in kind. 45 In the event of a hypothetical Soviet claim for ownership of all German
45
See supra section III.
property removed, it would not be possible to object that restitution in kind only applies to property coming from the same cultural-territorial area. Such requirement, as we have seen, 46 is implicitly called for in the Peace Treaties of 1947, but it has also been seen that they only offer one of the possible expressions of the concept of restitution in kind.
At the same time it would not be possible to raise the objection that only a peace treaty could settle the subject of restitution in kind. The question of the need or otherwise of a peace treaty to regulate the consequences of the conflict at the expense of the defeated State is too complex to be exhaustively examined here. However one can observe that in the case of a war of aggression, now generally qualifiable as an international crime, the offended States are entitled to make wideranging sanctions against the responsible State. Furthermore, that the conclusion of a peace treaty is not in itself necessary in order to establish a legal obligation of reparations for the responsible country, as the example of Germany after 1945 clearly shows.
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Quite paradoxically, the major obstacle to a recognition of the claim of legitimate ownership of the removed property derives from the very attitude held by the Soviet Government for almost fifty years. The complete secrecy maintained about the existence of special depots, together with the repeated denials by official authorities of the presence of German cultural items in the Soviet Union, is not easily reconciled with the current will to regard the removed German cultural property as legitimately owned as reparations. 48 The very idea of 'secret spoils' does not make any sense.
On the other hand, a refutation of the 'pledge' theory is more complex. It is not possible to deny, prima facie, some semblance of legitimacy in this position.
First, the Russian position has its roots in the past: we have seen that the theory which was in favour of restitution in kind for property of exceptional value was in fact proposed by the Soviet Union at the end of the war and that the principle of restitution of German cultural property still present in Soviet territory was approved by the Cabinet in 1957, but only 'on a reciprocal basis'. Also the efforts by various Moreover, the officially maintained assertion of the Soviet Union on the occasion of returning cultural property to East Germany in the fifties was always that of 'temporary custody' in the Soviet Union for its protection and conservation. It is easy to understand the reasons for this tact.
In the first weeks of occupation, the Soviet military administration made no mystery of the transport to the Soviet Union of cultural property found in Nazi depots, and that this was to be for reparations. Soon, however, the Soviet awareness of an ever increasing hostility to this type of use within the Allied High Command, and the ever more remote possibility of agreeing on a common policy with the United States and the other western ex-Allies regarding Germany, were the cause of the removed art treasures becoming a state secret for the Soviet Union. The fact that the provenance of the major part of the removed property was from museums or archives within the territory of the DDR made the situation even more embarrassing.
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Soviet Governments to rediscover some of the works of art stolen by the Nazis, in particular the Amber Hall of Zarskoje Selo, never ceased in these fifty years.
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What matters more is that, even in its current state, international law reveals a peculiar uncertainty on the question of restitution in kind of cultural property.
The Hague Convention of 14 May 1954, on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, is concerned with the fate of such property pendente bello, but not once the hostilities have ceased. Article 4 of the Convention commits the Contracting States among other things to prohibit, prevent and, if necessary, put a stop to any form of theft, pillage or misappropriation of, and any acts of vandalism directed against, cultural property. Article 1(3) of the Protocol of the Convention, signed on the same day, provides that cultural property taken from occupied territories contrary to Article 1(1), may not be retained as war reparations at the cessation of hostilities.
50
It should be observed that, in spite of appearances, Article 1 Protocol does not go far beyond that which was already provided for in Article 56 of the Hague Rules of 1907. In the first place, Article 1(1), Protocol, prohibits the 'exportation' of cultural property from occupied countries. By this language it is not at all clear if the provision intends to ban all types of removal or only the cases of exportation possibly contrary to internal restrictive laws. 51 Even taken in its broadest meaning, the provision does not provide for the different case of evacuation of cultural In order to accurately interpret this and other articles of the Protocol, one should keep in mind the fact that the Protocol is optional and that the reason for this choice was in fact due to the opposition of certain countries to accept binding regulations on the subject of restitution. Furthermore, it is useful to remember that the Convention does not apply to events which occurred prior to its entering into force. In fact, the reason for the exclusion of a section on restitution in the Hague Convention was an opinion of UNIDROIT circulated at the time of the negotiation of the Convention, which had made clear that all matters of private law should be excluded from the draft Convention, because the national private law on this matter differed too much to permit a common solution.
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The text of Article 1(1), Protocol reads: 'Each High Contracting Party undertakes to prevent the exportation, from a territory occupied by it during an armed conflict, of cultural property...' (emphasis by the Author).
property to the territory of the occupying State for the safeguarding and custody of the property itself.
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In the second place, and more importantly, both Protocol and the Convention leave the basic question unresolved, that is whether cultural property can in general make up part of reparations, for example by assigning it to a State under the title of restitution in kind within peace treaties, as happened in the Second World War period.
The 1977 additional Protocols to the Geneva Human Rights Convention of 1949, do not make any further contribution. Article 53 of the first Protocol confirms the prohibition on committing any acts of hostility towards historic monuments, works of art or places of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of the people, and also the ban on using'such objects as support for military efforts and on exercising retaliation upon them.
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International customary law does not present a uniform picture either. This is due to the fact that, first, the attention to the protection of cultural property by international law is a relatively recent phenomenon, and second, the practice of countries in the first half of this century was uncertain, as we have previously illustrated. Nonetheless we may wonder if, in the decades following the Second World War, an opinio juris has been found which by now excludes the retention or handing over of cultural property for reparations in any form, in consideration of a more general principle of territorial connection between cultural property and country of origin.
In the seventies an increased sensitivity and attention to the international protection of cultural property was developed by the international community. This was stimulated by the Conventions promoted by UNESCO; that of 14 November 1970, on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, 54 and that of 16 November 1972, on the Protection of the World's Cultural and Natural Heritage. 55 The need to value and safeguard national cultural heritage, felt especially by developing countries, which has been echoed by the United Nations' General Assembly 56 and by UNESCO, 57 contributed to the spreading and reinforcing of the idea of an international recognition and protection of a link between cultural property and a determined In my opinion, it is still premature to argue that the concept of protection of national cultural heritage has been recognized with such force in international law as to prevail over all other considerations, such as, the subject of reparations for international wrongs. 60 One would search in vain in the work of the International Law Commission on States Responsibility, with reference to the draft articles concerning reparations, for the trace of a debate on the matter. Article 7 of the Second Part, titled 'restitution in kind', 61 excludes restitution, among other things, to the extent that this is 'materially impossible'. In the comment of the Drafting Committee, 62 an exception is referred to for cases in which the object withdrawn from the territory of the victim State is destroyed, damaged or irreparable. No mention is made of restitution by replacement. The question has not even been tackled by any member of the ILC. 63 One could infer that the International Law Commission wanted to implicitly exclude the legitimacy of restitution by replacement in any context. However, one passage of the pertinent report by Arangio-Ruiz leads us rather to the conclusion that the members of the Commission, in all probability influenced by the opinion of the Rapporteur, 64 simply forgot to investigate the matter. 
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In a recent essay, Seidl-Hohenveldern warns of an excessive reliance on the notion of national heritage, which was hurriedly invoked to resolve all of the questions of cultural property plundered during conflicts. The author shows how, relying only on this criterion, the ownership of the treasure of Priamus would become fairly controversial: in particular, a possible claim by Turkey could in the last resort be opposed only on the exception of prescription.
67
Rather than demagogically referring to a fashionable slogan of uncertain legal soundness, it would be preferable to focus attention on the attribution of a special legal status to, and a distinctive international protection of, cultural property in itself, whatever its origin. This status would hold in times of war and of peace. It would not be a sign of bad politics if the parties finally arrived at a compromise in which Germany, in exchange for the restitution of most items, 68 offered some tangible signs of its commitment to the protection of cultural heritage in itself. It could contribute for example, to the financing of the restoration of Russian monuments or the institution of Russo-German cultural centres. Unfortunately this ideal solution does not seem currently to have much chance of success. The means considered by which Germany might force the Russian Government into a less intransigent position must therefore be considered.
First of all, Germany can take precautions to discourage a possible sale of the cultural property by Russia, the possibility of which the Russian Government has always denied, but which can not be excluded per se. 69 The range of measures could include the legal seizure of cultural property, in the case of its being brought into German territory, or the conclusion of international agreements with other States to this end, and to the imposition of sanctions against international auctioneers whose branches cooperate with the sale.
Direct retaliation against Russia is more problematic. Obviously Germany could suspend the application of the Treaty of Cultural Cooperation of 1992 and also other clauses of the Treaty of Cooperation and Good Neighbourhood of 1990. However, it is evident that in such cases, above all if it lead to a cooling of economic ties and military cooperation, the political tension between the two countries would rise to an intolerable level for the German Government.
Regarding, however, private art collections, the option remains open to the legal heirs, as an alternative to diplomatic protection from the German Government, 70 of 
